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Windows Analysis Report
fg}.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	fg}.exe
Analysis ID:	1465717
MD5:	e9a886374becfb0a5b1dc0ffcee1a04a
SHA1:	c692a6e9437299878b43ea5fa8ee1be0e1f5c782
SHA256:	7e694dfc8060bbbaf8c4139f974696d5fc3be48bd9d9d46eb166f55f7c024fb2
Tags:	exe
Infos:

Detection

XWorm

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Antivirus detection for dropped file

Found malware configuration

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected XWorm

.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

AI detected suspicious sample

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Machine Learning detection for sample

Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag

Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)

Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings

AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)

Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)

Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Detected potential crypto function

Drops PE files

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sigma detected: Startup Folder File Write

Stores files to the Windows start menu directory

Uses 32bit PE files

Yara signature match

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

fg}.exe (PID: 7540 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe" MD5: E9A886374BECFB0A5B1DC0FFCEE1A04A)

cleanup

Malware Threat Intel

Provided by

Name	Description	Attribution	Blogpost URLs	Link
XWorm	Malware with wide range of capabilities ranging from RAT to ransomware.	No Attribution	https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/xworm-malware-communication-analysis/ https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/xworm-technical-analysis-of-a-new-malware-version/ https://blog.cyble.com/2022/08/19/evilcoder-project-selling-multiple-dangerous-tools-online/ https://cert.pl/en/posts/2023/10/deworming-the-xworm/ https://embee-research.ghost.io/infrastructure-analysis-with-dns-pivoting/	https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.xworm

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Xworm

{"C2 url": ["people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg"], "Port": "54251", "Aes key": "90734242", "SPL": "<Xwormmm>", "Install file": "USB.exe", "Version": "XWorm V5.2"}

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
fg}.exe	JoeSecurity_XWorm	Yara detected XWorm	Joe Security
fg}.exe	MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT	Detects AsyncRAT	ditekSHen	0xce04:$cnc1: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0 0xcea1:$cnc2: Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 11_4_1 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/11.0 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1 0xcfb6:$cnc3: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36 0xc93b:$cnc4: POST / HTTP/1.1

Dropped Files

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe	JoeSecurity_XWorm	Yara detected XWorm	Joe Security
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe	MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT	Detects AsyncRAT	ditekSHen	0xce04:$cnc1: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0 0xcea1:$cnc2: Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 11_4_1 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/11.0 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1 0xcfb6:$cnc3: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36 0xc93b:$cnc4: POST / HTTP/1.1

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000000.1314086519.00000000004D2000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp	JoeSecurity_XWorm	Yara detected XWorm	Joe Security
00000000.00000000.1314086519.00000000004D2000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp	MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT	Detects AsyncRAT	ditekSHen	0xcc04:$cnc1: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0 0xcca1:$cnc2: Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 11_4_1 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/11.0 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1 0xcdb6:$cnc3: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36 0xc73b:$cnc4: POST / HTTP/1.1
Process Memory Space: fg}.exe PID: 7540	JoeSecurity_XWorm	Yara detected XWorm	Joe Security

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0.0.fg}.exe.4d0000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_XWorm	Yara detected XWorm	Joe Security
0.0.fg}.exe.4d0000.0.unpack	MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT	Detects AsyncRAT	ditekSHen	0xce04:$cnc1: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:66.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/66.0 0xcea1:$cnc2: Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 11_4_1 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/11.0 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1 0xcfb6:$cnc3: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36 0xc93b:$cnc4: POST / HTTP/1.1

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Sigma detected: Startup Folder File Write

Source: File created

Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research): Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe, ProcessId: 7540, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\XClient.lnk

Snort Signatures

⊘No Snort rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: fg}.exe

Avira: detected

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Source: people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg

Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware

Antivirus detection for dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe

Avira: detection malicious, Label: HEUR/AGEN.1305769

Found malware configuration

Source: fg}.exe

Malware Configuration Extractor: Xworm {"C2 url": ["people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg"], "Port": "54251", "Aes key": "90734242", "SPL": "<Xwormmm>", "Install file": "USB.exe", "Version": "XWorm V5.2"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 71%

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: fg}.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 71%

AI detected suspicious sample

Source: Submited Sample

Integrated Neural Analysis Model: Matched 100.0% probability

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Machine Learning detection for sample

Source: fg}.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings

Source: fg}.exe	String decryptor: people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg
Source: fg}.exe	String decryptor: 54251
Source: fg}.exe	String decryptor: 90734242
Source: fg}.exe	String decryptor: <Xwormmm>
Source: fg}.exe	String decryptor: XWorm V5.2
Source: fg}.exe	String decryptor: USB.exe
Source: fg}.exe	String decryptor: %AppData%
Source: fg}.exe	String decryptor: XClient.exe

Source: fg}.exe

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source: fg}.exe

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Networking

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49706 -> 147.185.221.20:54251

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 147.185.221.20 147.185.221.20

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: SALSGIVERUS SALSGIVERUS

Source: unknown

UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg

Source: fg}.exe, 00000000.00000002.3778806031.00000000029F1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp

String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name

Operating System Destruction

Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

Process information set: 01 00 00 00

Jump to behavior

System Summary

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Source: fg}.exe, type: SAMPLE	Matched rule: Detects AsyncRAT Author: ditekSHen
Source: 0.0.fg}.exe.4d0000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects AsyncRAT Author: ditekSHen
Source: 00000000.00000000.1314086519.00000000004D2000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detects AsyncRAT Author: ditekSHen
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe, type: DROPPED	Matched rule: Detects AsyncRAT Author: ditekSHen

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF886E273A6	0_2_00007FF886E273A6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF886E21168	0_2_00007FF886E21168
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF886E28152	0_2_00007FF886E28152
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF886E20E2D	0_2_00007FF886E20E2D

Source: fg}.exe

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE

Source: fg}.exe, type: SAMPLE	Matched rule: MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT author = ditekSHen, description = Detects AsyncRAT
Source: 0.0.fg}.exe.4d0000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT author = ditekSHen, description = Detects AsyncRAT
Source: 00000000.00000000.1314086519.00000000004D2000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT author = ditekSHen, description = Detects AsyncRAT
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe, type: DROPPED	Matched rule: MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT author = ditekSHen, description = Detects AsyncRAT

Source: fg}.exe, lZz16auSsASjwTFg.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock'
Source: fg}.exe, EUpXc4FBNK70VCAV.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock'
Source: fg}.exe, EUpXc4FBNK70VCAV.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock'
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, lZz16auSsASjwTFg.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock'
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, EUpXc4FBNK70VCAV.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock'
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, EUpXc4FBNK70VCAV.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock'

Source: fg}.exe, kKP4mhaiB40j0WJyk55Hty3KpaIHMj.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal.IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)
Source: fg}.exe, kKP4mhaiB40j0WJyk55Hty3KpaIHMj.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent()
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, kKP4mhaiB40j0WJyk55Hty3KpaIHMj.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal.IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, kKP4mhaiB40j0WJyk55Hty3KpaIHMj.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent()

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@1/2@1/1

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Mutant created: NULL
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\U3NiITrpodUSuXtA

Source: fg}.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: fg}.exe

Static file information: TRID: Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: fg}.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 71%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: mscoree.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: vcruntime140_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: ucrtbase_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: sxs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: scrrun.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: propsys.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: linkinfo.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: ntshrui.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: cscapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: mswsock.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: fwpuclnt.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: wbemcomn.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: avicap32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: msvfw32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Section loaded: winmm.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424B88AFB8}\InProcServer32

Jump to behavior

Source: XClient.lnk.0.dr

LNK file: ..\..\..\..\..\XClient.exe

Source: fg}.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: fg}.exe

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Data Obfuscation

.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)

Source: fg}.exe, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	.Net Code: NewLateBinding.LateCall(obj, (Type)null, "Invoke", new object[2]{null,new object[5]{_22JSrHb70IyjmjkQwaFdAAQ8umAk3gzviAF3bg60F4GSApoWpWa9Cd2EZIfuPyujxRaseQmqA00G2uDGPMD4GruG.nMEbUPDap95wy0tD8G3QrrJloRUwbW84rut2Z5z3ntZYcf1j1UMIUHirThSVoS9JyTnhWAyKXE4O0NVGGnNPFC81,_22JSrHb70IyjmjkQwaFdAAQ8umAk3gzviAF3bg60F4GSApoWpWa9Cd2EZIfuPyujxRaseQmqA00G2uDGPMD4GruG.Tbb8DvPKSl0W6nuy6DAnsFvy2sLkkWnuAhU8hRKAwLQFJAVPrLUpiakqKYDJMWpPeYOe8q5rkq3dI1uYF8pbazrj,_22JSrHb70IyjmjkQwaFdAAQ8umAk3gzviAF3bg60F4GSApoWpWa9Cd2EZIfuPyujxRaseQmqA00G2uDGPMD4GruG.TNy0J82033vcFgs2bxsQ6OvPaPewgKOXcB89qXImEPx2ablhRct5aydB7QOcOYni1cf5bd4rcEo635tlKHC80aKI,_22JSrHb70IyjmjkQwaFdAAQ8umAk3gzviAF3bg60F4GSApoWpWa9Cd2EZIfuPyujxRaseQmqA00G2uDGPMD4GruG._7L9qZtgXJHqGXmKaVPAfJ0VrtBZYNCmIsa5T6sNfSGMXLn1CJ65HSPz5bgd4ba6oFgpQxPsZHjbfKSbnLaMxSRkf,EUpXc4FBNK70VCAV.SsM4HaS3mxdXVuvi()}}, (string[])null, (Type[])null, (bool[])null, true)
Source: fg}.exe, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	.Net Code: NewLateBinding.LateCall(obj, (Type)null, "Invoke", new object[2]{null,new object[2]{fsmI8eEC06QTzO0u[2],EUpXc4FBNK70VCAV.S52Z16hS3e7QaWtV(Convert.FromBase64String(fsmI8eEC06QTzO0u[3]))}}, (string[])null, (Type[])null, (bool[])null, true)
Source: fg}.exe, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	.Net Code: NewLateBinding.LateCall(obj, (Type)null, "Invoke", new object[2]{null,new object[1] { fsmI8eEC06QTzO0u[2] }}, (string[])null, (Type[])null, (bool[])null, true)
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	.Net Code: NewLateBinding.LateCall(obj, (Type)null, "Invoke", new object[2]{null,new object[5]{_22JSrHb70IyjmjkQwaFdAAQ8umAk3gzviAF3bg60F4GSApoWpWa9Cd2EZIfuPyujxRaseQmqA00G2uDGPMD4GruG.nMEbUPDap95wy0tD8G3QrrJloRUwbW84rut2Z5z3ntZYcf1j1UMIUHirThSVoS9JyTnhWAyKXE4O0NVGGnNPFC81,_22JSrHb70IyjmjkQwaFdAAQ8umAk3gzviAF3bg60F4GSApoWpWa9Cd2EZIfuPyujxRaseQmqA00G2uDGPMD4GruG.Tbb8DvPKSl0W6nuy6DAnsFvy2sLkkWnuAhU8hRKAwLQFJAVPrLUpiakqKYDJMWpPeYOe8q5rkq3dI1uYF8pbazrj,_22JSrHb70IyjmjkQwaFdAAQ8umAk3gzviAF3bg60F4GSApoWpWa9Cd2EZIfuPyujxRaseQmqA00G2uDGPMD4GruG.TNy0J82033vcFgs2bxsQ6OvPaPewgKOXcB89qXImEPx2ablhRct5aydB7QOcOYni1cf5bd4rcEo635tlKHC80aKI,_22JSrHb70IyjmjkQwaFdAAQ8umAk3gzviAF3bg60F4GSApoWpWa9Cd2EZIfuPyujxRaseQmqA00G2uDGPMD4GruG._7L9qZtgXJHqGXmKaVPAfJ0VrtBZYNCmIsa5T6sNfSGMXLn1CJ65HSPz5bgd4ba6oFgpQxPsZHjbfKSbnLaMxSRkf,EUpXc4FBNK70VCAV.SsM4HaS3mxdXVuvi()}}, (string[])null, (Type[])null, (bool[])null, true)
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	.Net Code: NewLateBinding.LateCall(obj, (Type)null, "Invoke", new object[2]{null,new object[2]{fsmI8eEC06QTzO0u[2],EUpXc4FBNK70VCAV.S52Z16hS3e7QaWtV(Convert.FromBase64String(fsmI8eEC06QTzO0u[3]))}}, (string[])null, (Type[])null, (bool[])null, true)
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	.Net Code: NewLateBinding.LateCall(obj, (Type)null, "Invoke", new object[2]{null,new object[1] { fsmI8eEC06QTzO0u[2] }}, (string[])null, (Type[])null, (bool[])null, true)

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Source: fg}.exe, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	.Net Code: TMxdjZlV6A3c8E5kT4gZnzVnxlsBqT System.AppDomain.Load(byte[])
Source: fg}.exe, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	.Net Code: qRlclbJIAjME5rxC System.AppDomain.Load(byte[])
Source: fg}.exe, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	.Net Code: qRlclbJIAjME5rxC
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	.Net Code: TMxdjZlV6A3c8E5kT4gZnzVnxlsBqT System.AppDomain.Load(byte[])
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	.Net Code: qRlclbJIAjME5rxC System.AppDomain.Load(byte[])
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	.Net Code: qRlclbJIAjME5rxC

Source: fg}.exe, 22JSrHb70IyjmjkQwaFdAAQ8umAk3gzviAF3bg60F4GSApoWpWa9Cd2EZIfuPyujxRaseQmqA00G2uDGPMD4GruG.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'VYpVGDWSAOe6hGubN8jike3gxLeeu9LaQ2G23XigKCwNlihEE5Pod', 'WP7Qw82qutWFuS8E8YGsgUNMTf3osQADq31co6NAMQXo9yES2aSEK', 'oUCjC2uqO8QBu8RgZ9GbVqBSBRq6jbvPUkgExeCuWur5XGHinnLMP', 'eUZQ1nMBI9TF4iYb4io4oBk5wQl9q6035SBXG0r6p9UdbwEnCJS0o'
Source: fg}.exe, rd1bhuRAKvlsbm7m.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'QHS5U8dWqQD1x6V1', 'BFdz5pWi7ZenaEOA', 'Ol7nGZfDr3hMk5GK', 'lQ1cm8pMTiy5z', 'HiIorPCy5FL62', 'VybHHEQcEZJsz', 'dgV45OfYJJnKP', 'KDg2LphpdE4TK', 'SRAjggBKdY4AL', 'ix66QvrGJk8d7'
Source: fg}.exe, q8dlgS785uD2Q.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'Equals', 'GetHashCode', 'GetType', 'ToString', 'Create__Instance__', 'Dispose__Instance__', 'LLz4pj5zt0DtvvHmrAEXneSjfX9ZcnfPyxsXQGy92PQbaaaOPjDJ4', 'NaJAOowLOndXiuv7fCH0dAmV5Kr9t13lf4aed4zwaFSWR8Js571ko', 'PbTsjYGRyzhNDPUJi20QKBQidM3whPOK8gpmSG10hkVdtWLVxwx2X', 'N2QOjYZ80Yi7RcpPrf5MsXbsVQfvFz6vw3Lm642zfDgtPK7clyEJa'
Source: fg}.exe, kKP4mhaiB40j0WJyk55Hty3KpaIHMj.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '_2XlQ068DxNno4SwIVnNSkTcVUA8S1z', 'i06Rc2x8K5e7hAymiZXwlzwTbB5Rw6', 'Ah4JehHa6fY7Ef3fmBSyIa4kt6Hjox', 'gDN1k4XJTMrxAEh6mHEnvrzbG27iXl', 'cbpzoL2Bdn1YU8aoYgU41mBaLRpTYq', '_8BsSIIX8BDBnDHyIMnfUwykWXhEIE3', 'ODhWklo0CnUCA1VevT0gqEgnJ9xyI3', 'K9eKXo6NvVNvKchMbsN9MfmfkbTp8e', '_2yQr8kL4iBf09TcCv6uJ5BME9RXli9', 'uNBBahDpjUAuFo1wNhqUA5utpp2cgu'
Source: fg}.exe, EtrArFBKiAHGxPz1.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'T74c1AnWCbiA2t8y', 'e6LhvvnOVI08rRm2R6rQaBvcmLuN5aQHVzuvwtFhKCOqxE8mbNEHnQvMzFkhchjIYgmHgA', '_8IOWKuWVIdaeVy8cHx5XBqXDqG3Pxmu1fL1bzfRLEeHJtmSIx7Iufvl7WEzq7v0aZ2JvEe', 'XW8ZVmGVYtkundDKXYfQiuJpL2pKBFPaIl16ShOR16qTWf56giqByxh05poIuAU2xQCFQZ', 'eOd2yR200fg6GMEk6TKlEHMDTCqF1sWJUlTQlAplOeMg6OgETkfreYRQssoXRVKPGUblAB'
Source: fg}.exe, x796DvNGKZNtNfCKciEBF83GKKh7zn.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'idMhS0aU0oZm8dxRmk716XdTaharWk', 'MPu2dk1y77ncRTW7uOY8mlhtLgfXEF', 'ePSSaXXpBSdoEsH48Kp98e7ZOsLYrF', 'fYQFKaUa2elnCn0DqQ8MG2f6MJj7cMlj7s39GdUj3oejp0fbIhg91', 'CLVuuLz4UzcL1wWuSLnPpp86JUKJuEWC1gzYIG0UPGyF7cAbfqeJS', '_54vDnPhVZt7koS9G8bej34GF1cik23nsGkLsip1XKc9bG9tN1H3Ux', 'gvwPtL0RThGdmtZeKa1dJf79CvwshY8j7RDkIssAslQPkb0IplOoD', '_44T6FtJfoG73LwCe0unSh5N5SOmDCpBSYc5lJidnqFIXqpZYeCY8g', 'ZJowQS3dvs4UbQ1lhvJL0mPkujtVT5yzVpWoHbcYTbgYeFx8l7vhX', 'gzil4pkwp89xZAjCFqyY8tkg2quv32HxuXYPtX23rCzo1guzfeutm'
Source: fg}.exe, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'inPzDvTlMzfqmc1UMQNl6jAOyEaMei', 'TMxdjZlV6A3c8E5kT4gZnzVnxlsBqT', 'IQ9SMEqbs4i3FxF8dqH2UpgUzISH8P', 'dWGDDgPuqQLvumdThjlHpYkXDrkWGQ', '_7ciVgin3ST1tcwkNTB7pTiy4eiu6xk', 'MbswDvNMxpjI61S2QF1cDNPlZu8EtD', 'FjIGET6Nlffcqs5OgLL1EBQLmaLYiG', 'M8pXWdo4tK8pdYuZ8QYnfDBOonuYl4', 'RLnC87NJn4huG750OBOI06RO0vRjX0', '_16XJrehhRxGdaili'
Source: fg}.exe, xt1OJQtnZDKHEPNK.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '_7lZNRGwroJ4qslNC', 'zcK9B8WPi5nPvQL3', '_7yWUk31HZEqy56io', 'MB3kJjh8n6S8wjyc', '_9Q5gfsYcbP6BSizV7g0BGxdEE0zY5vijNEACLwOtYoarPARYvcpWoMXd17jfJUe7Da3akb', '_56QDWxbLIHhceei8K67lvggY5d23L7lTPPBRrf9yJ7th8hKsXp7g4qm4HrAEFwYteBkW1b', 'm03NTAK0haWqjUELKBRADocsdzBum1kfiaQDSTHJdQlRaQZCM90X330I42gw5RMONHGRd2', 'isNGB5rBZoQRX2PiRk9Md2PqGjeq1bIB6qg2Ed4sF1TyuHUqtwftjrf0vyAlDJPiKNxi31', 'jsmm7Evxbheax', 'dcHMiJUOfGv3K'
Source: fg}.exe, EUpXc4FBNK70VCAV.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '_5B1lb0INkn036PCS', '_5cHJEKe5KOFKsz15', 'FEbiqXrMgsxi3ecw', '_9HrIZrbMbBTI38Ea', 'CsZgJhYiBtfsNUlB', '_5thQRYKEXPu8nJJk', 's2n2QkhjGyAe3OpO', 'NWRuaUOogKQrFFFo', '_3MS2hGmnaHyZy12H', 'wv4ixeNFMThEenLL'
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, 22JSrHb70IyjmjkQwaFdAAQ8umAk3gzviAF3bg60F4GSApoWpWa9Cd2EZIfuPyujxRaseQmqA00G2uDGPMD4GruG.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'VYpVGDWSAOe6hGubN8jike3gxLeeu9LaQ2G23XigKCwNlihEE5Pod', 'WP7Qw82qutWFuS8E8YGsgUNMTf3osQADq31co6NAMQXo9yES2aSEK', 'oUCjC2uqO8QBu8RgZ9GbVqBSBRq6jbvPUkgExeCuWur5XGHinnLMP', 'eUZQ1nMBI9TF4iYb4io4oBk5wQl9q6035SBXG0r6p9UdbwEnCJS0o'
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, rd1bhuRAKvlsbm7m.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'QHS5U8dWqQD1x6V1', 'BFdz5pWi7ZenaEOA', 'Ol7nGZfDr3hMk5GK', 'lQ1cm8pMTiy5z', 'HiIorPCy5FL62', 'VybHHEQcEZJsz', 'dgV45OfYJJnKP', 'KDg2LphpdE4TK', 'SRAjggBKdY4AL', 'ix66QvrGJk8d7'
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, q8dlgS785uD2Q.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'Equals', 'GetHashCode', 'GetType', 'ToString', 'Create__Instance__', 'Dispose__Instance__', 'LLz4pj5zt0DtvvHmrAEXneSjfX9ZcnfPyxsXQGy92PQbaaaOPjDJ4', 'NaJAOowLOndXiuv7fCH0dAmV5Kr9t13lf4aed4zwaFSWR8Js571ko', 'PbTsjYGRyzhNDPUJi20QKBQidM3whPOK8gpmSG10hkVdtWLVxwx2X', 'N2QOjYZ80Yi7RcpPrf5MsXbsVQfvFz6vw3Lm642zfDgtPK7clyEJa'
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, kKP4mhaiB40j0WJyk55Hty3KpaIHMj.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '_2XlQ068DxNno4SwIVnNSkTcVUA8S1z', 'i06Rc2x8K5e7hAymiZXwlzwTbB5Rw6', 'Ah4JehHa6fY7Ef3fmBSyIa4kt6Hjox', 'gDN1k4XJTMrxAEh6mHEnvrzbG27iXl', 'cbpzoL2Bdn1YU8aoYgU41mBaLRpTYq', '_8BsSIIX8BDBnDHyIMnfUwykWXhEIE3', 'ODhWklo0CnUCA1VevT0gqEgnJ9xyI3', 'K9eKXo6NvVNvKchMbsN9MfmfkbTp8e', '_2yQr8kL4iBf09TcCv6uJ5BME9RXli9', 'uNBBahDpjUAuFo1wNhqUA5utpp2cgu'
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, EtrArFBKiAHGxPz1.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'T74c1AnWCbiA2t8y', 'e6LhvvnOVI08rRm2R6rQaBvcmLuN5aQHVzuvwtFhKCOqxE8mbNEHnQvMzFkhchjIYgmHgA', '_8IOWKuWVIdaeVy8cHx5XBqXDqG3Pxmu1fL1bzfRLEeHJtmSIx7Iufvl7WEzq7v0aZ2JvEe', 'XW8ZVmGVYtkundDKXYfQiuJpL2pKBFPaIl16ShOR16qTWf56giqByxh05poIuAU2xQCFQZ', 'eOd2yR200fg6GMEk6TKlEHMDTCqF1sWJUlTQlAplOeMg6OgETkfreYRQssoXRVKPGUblAB'
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, x796DvNGKZNtNfCKciEBF83GKKh7zn.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'idMhS0aU0oZm8dxRmk716XdTaharWk', 'MPu2dk1y77ncRTW7uOY8mlhtLgfXEF', 'ePSSaXXpBSdoEsH48Kp98e7ZOsLYrF', 'fYQFKaUa2elnCn0DqQ8MG2f6MJj7cMlj7s39GdUj3oejp0fbIhg91', 'CLVuuLz4UzcL1wWuSLnPpp86JUKJuEWC1gzYIG0UPGyF7cAbfqeJS', '_54vDnPhVZt7koS9G8bej34GF1cik23nsGkLsip1XKc9bG9tN1H3Ux', 'gvwPtL0RThGdmtZeKa1dJf79CvwshY8j7RDkIssAslQPkb0IplOoD', '_44T6FtJfoG73LwCe0unSh5N5SOmDCpBSYc5lJidnqFIXqpZYeCY8g', 'ZJowQS3dvs4UbQ1lhvJL0mPkujtVT5yzVpWoHbcYTbgYeFx8l7vhX', 'gzil4pkwp89xZAjCFqyY8tkg2quv32HxuXYPtX23rCzo1guzfeutm'
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, Mh6pKaIqYgtBe5OQhobwC9hwd9Jv8x.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: 'inPzDvTlMzfqmc1UMQNl6jAOyEaMei', 'TMxdjZlV6A3c8E5kT4gZnzVnxlsBqT', 'IQ9SMEqbs4i3FxF8dqH2UpgUzISH8P', 'dWGDDgPuqQLvumdThjlHpYkXDrkWGQ', '_7ciVgin3ST1tcwkNTB7pTiy4eiu6xk', 'MbswDvNMxpjI61S2QF1cDNPlZu8EtD', 'FjIGET6Nlffcqs5OgLL1EBQLmaLYiG', 'M8pXWdo4tK8pdYuZ8QYnfDBOonuYl4', 'RLnC87NJn4huG750OBOI06RO0vRjX0', '_16XJrehhRxGdaili'
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, xt1OJQtnZDKHEPNK.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '_7lZNRGwroJ4qslNC', 'zcK9B8WPi5nPvQL3', '_7yWUk31HZEqy56io', 'MB3kJjh8n6S8wjyc', '_9Q5gfsYcbP6BSizV7g0BGxdEE0zY5vijNEACLwOtYoarPARYvcpWoMXd17jfJUe7Da3akb', '_56QDWxbLIHhceei8K67lvggY5d23L7lTPPBRrf9yJ7th8hKsXp7g4qm4HrAEFwYteBkW1b', 'm03NTAK0haWqjUELKBRADocsdzBum1kfiaQDSTHJdQlRaQZCM90X330I42gw5RMONHGRd2', 'isNGB5rBZoQRX2PiRk9Md2PqGjeq1bIB6qg2Ed4sF1TyuHUqtwftjrf0vyAlDJPiKNxi31', 'jsmm7Evxbheax', 'dcHMiJUOfGv3K'
Source: XClient.exe.0.dr, EUpXc4FBNK70VCAV.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '_5B1lb0INkn036PCS', '_5cHJEKe5KOFKsz15', 'FEbiqXrMgsxi3ecw', '_9HrIZrbMbBTI38Ea', 'CsZgJhYiBtfsNUlB', '_5thQRYKEXPu8nJJk', 's2n2QkhjGyAe3OpO', 'NWRuaUOogKQrFFFo', '_3MS2hGmnaHyZy12H', 'wv4ixeNFMThEenLL'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\XClient.lnk

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\XClient.lnk

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_VideoController
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_VideoController

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Memory allocated: A20000 memory reserve \| memory write watch			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Memory allocated: 1A9F0000 memory reserve \| memory write watch			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 8922			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 925			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe TID: 7704

Thread sleep time: -1844674407370954s >= -30000s

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	File Volume queried: C:\ FullSizeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	File Volume queried: C:\ FullSizeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	File Volume queried: C:\ FullSizeInformation	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: fg}.exe, 00000000.00000002.3780080705.000000001B880000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAWtpMo%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dlln=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a" />

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

Jump to behavior

Source: fg}.exe, 00000000.00000002.3778806031.000000000303E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: 'PING!<Xwormmm>Program Manager<Xwormmm>0
Source: fg}.exe, 00000000.00000002.3778806031.000000000303E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: fg}.exe, 00000000.00000002.3778806031.000000000303E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: PING!<Xwormmm>Program Manager<Xwormmm>0
Source: fg}.exe, 00000000.00000002.3778806031.000000000303E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: 'PING!<Xwormmm>Program Manager<Xwormmm>0@
Source: fg}.exe, 00000000.00000002.3778806031.000000000303E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager2

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe VolumeInformation			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	Queries volume information: C:\ VolumeInformation			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Source: fg}.exe, 00000000.00000002.3780080705.000000001B8DD000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, fg}.exe, 00000000.00000002.3780080705.000000001B880000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: %ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\MsMpeng.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\SecurityCenter2 : Select * from AntivirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\SecurityCenter2 : Select * from AntivirusProduct

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected XWorm

Source: Yara match	File source: fg}.exe, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.0.fg}.exe.4d0000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000000.1314086519.00000000004D2000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: fg}.exe PID: 7540, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe, type: DROPPED

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected XWorm

Source: Yara match	File source: fg}.exe, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.0.fg}.exe.4d0000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000000.1314086519.00000000004D2000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: fg}.exe PID: 7540, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe, type: DROPPED

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	11 Windows Management Instrumentation	2 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	1 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	221 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	11 Archive Collected Data	1 Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	2 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	1 Disable or Modify Tools	LSASS Memory	1 Process Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Non-Standard Port	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	1 DLL Side-Loading	131 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Security Account Manager	131 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 Process Injection	NTDS	1 Application Window Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	11 Application Layer Protocol	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	LSA Secrets	1 File and Directory Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	2 Software Packing	Cached Domain Credentials	13 System Information Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop
DNS	Web Services	External Remote Services	Systemd Timers	Startup Items	Startup Items	1 DLL Side-Loading	DCSync	Remote System Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Commonly Used Port	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Inhibit System Recovery

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
fg}.exe	71%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.XWormRAT
fg}.exe	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1305769
fg}.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1305769
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe	71%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.XWormRAT

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	0%	URL Reputation	safe
people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg	147.185.221.20	true	true		unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg	true	Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	fg}.exe, 00000000.00000002.3778806031.00000000029F1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
147.185.221.20	people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg	United States		12087	SALSGIVERUS	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	40.0.0 Tourmaline
Analysis ID:	1465717
Start date and time:	2024-07-02 00:31:10 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 32s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	6
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	fg}.exe
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@1/2@1/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 98% Number of executed functions: 4 Number of non-executed functions: 1
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240000 for current running targets taking high CPU consumption

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, dllhost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SIHClient.exe, conhost.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ocsp.digicert.com, slscr.update.microsoft.com, fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
Execution Graph export aborted for target fg}.exe, PID 7540 because it is empty
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: fg}.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
18:32:16	API Interceptor	13656500x Sleep call for process: fg}.exe modified
23:32:04	Autostart	Run: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\XClient.lnk

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link
147.185.221.20	build.exe	Get hash	malicious	RedLine	Browse
	Ph58Rkdxor.exe	Get hash	malicious	XWorm	Browse
	4kvADqDmZ4.exe	Get hash	malicious	PureLog Stealer, XWorm	Browse
	Discord Tools.exe	Get hash	malicious	XWorm	Browse
	Image logger beta.exe	Get hash	malicious	AsyncRAT, XWorm	Browse
	fart.exe	Get hash	malicious	AsyncRAT, DcRat, Quasar, XWorm	Browse
	fart.exe	Get hash	malicious	AsyncRAT, DcRat, Quasar, XWorm	Browse
	Shiba Genisis Loader.exe	Get hash	malicious	AsyncRAT, DcRat	Browse
	ModStickInjectorV1.exe	Get hash	malicious	AsyncRAT, DcRat, Quasar, XWorm	Browse
	Loader.exe	Get hash	malicious	Quasar	Browse

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg	build.exe	Get hash	malicious	RedLine	Browse	147.185.221.20

ASNs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
SALSGIVERUS	build.exe	Get hash	malicious	RedLine	Browse	147.185.221.20
	bJLd0SUHfj.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	147.185.221.18
	PGjIoaqfQY.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	147.185.221.18
	V6363OW8Rh.exe	Get hash	malicious	XWorm	Browse	147.185.221.18
	x6221haMsm.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	147.185.221.18
	Ph58Rkdxor.exe	Get hash	malicious	XWorm	Browse	147.185.221.20
	4kvADqDmZ4.exe	Get hash	malicious	PureLog Stealer, XWorm	Browse	147.185.221.20
	BviOG97ArX.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai, Moobot	Browse	147.176.119.108
	a.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	147.185.221.18
	hatabat.exe	Get hash	malicious	Blank Grabber, DCRat, XWorm	Browse	147.185.221.17

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe
File Type:	MS Windows shortcut, Item id list present, Points to a file or directory, Has Relative path, Archive, ctime=Mon Jul 1 21:32:03 2024, mtime=Mon Jul 1 21:32:03 2024, atime=Mon Jul 1 21:32:03 2024, length=59392, window=hide
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	763
Entropy (8bit):	5.044858479027047
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:8S24o6idtChToyedY//pFTr4X7SLcFXXjAXVwNHkMp5mV:8EO8oyZfEX4cFXzAXVwCMp5m
MD5:	97A12910391572B661EB114ECEC6F126
SHA1:	FDCED288806CF8BF247983F75FCC583D85F00BDF
SHA-256:	3848F0A8FF68EA6605992B9726398902BB393148346AD2C245D37BA2A129F4D2
SHA-512:	11B34F8B7AABC0603D42D76B55C60038DC5441EAF42BAEFDD101107D66E637BA5F854662444BEF463133418F586F838D8F5E4FFDF4B4F516E799C43A3733DFC8
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	L..................F.... ...X..~.....X.~.....X.~............................v.:..DG..Yr?.D..U..k0.&...&.......bBDj...\J.w.....V.~........t...CFSF..1.....EWsG..AppData...t.Y^...H.g.3..(.....gVA.G..k...@......EWsG.X............................=...A.p.p.D.a.t.a...B.V.1......X....Roaming.@......EWsG.X............................K...R.o.a.m.i.n.g.....b.2......X.. .XClient.exe.H.......X...X......^.....................5..X.C.l.i.e.n.t...e.x.e.......X...............-.......W...........T[&......C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe........\.....\.....\.....\.....\.X.C.l.i.e.n.t...e.x.e.`.......X.......571345...........hT..CrF.f4... ...E._c...,...E...hT..CrF.f4... ...E._c...,...E..E.......9...1SPS..mD..pH.H@..=x.....h....H.....K...YM...?................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	59392
Entropy (8bit):	5.897811546999433
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	1536:R3iKaQ7P66xgWbXPIT+VvVkby0A4OiUheAImOF+V3:fPFN0Tg9kby0siA/ROF+V3
MD5:	E9A886374BECFB0A5B1DC0FFCEE1A04A
SHA1:	C692A6E9437299878B43EA5FA8EE1BE0E1F5C782
SHA-256:	7E694DFC8060BBBAF8C4139F974696D5FC3BE48BD9D9D46EB166F55F7C024FB2
SHA-512:	BC9E0AFFC52EA052EEBF1D4B2AFF0E89BEC9B4780F14914EF14E27BB44A83E266791555FD79B5C1117953B37FE4623B2F6AFEFFB4F281A0D94E9A4261B882284
Malicious:	true
Yara Hits:	Rule: JoeSecurity_XWorm, Description: Yara detected XWorm, Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe, Author: Joe Security Rule: MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT, Description: Detects AsyncRAT, Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe, Author: ditekSHen
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Avira, Detection: 100% Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100% Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 71%
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...H..f............................>.... ........@.. .......................@............@.....................................K............................ ....................................................... ............... ..H............text...D.... ...................... ..`.rsrc...............................@..@.reloc....... ......................@..B................ .......H.......TW..........&.....................................................(.....r...p. .B....(.....r#..p. i....s.........s.........s.........s..........r...p. .[...r...p. &....rg..p. .x!..r...p. .....r?..p. ).....((....r...p. .....r...p. .Kl.&(....&+..+5sH... .... .'..oI...(...~....-.(A...(3...~....oJ...&.-..r...p. .#...rU..p. .#;..r...p.r-..p. ..................j..................sK..............~........."(C...+.:.t....(>...+..r...p. ..G.

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.897811546999433
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	fg}.exe
File size:	59'392 bytes
MD5:	e9a886374becfb0a5b1dc0ffcee1a04a
SHA1:	c692a6e9437299878b43ea5fa8ee1be0e1f5c782
SHA256:	7e694dfc8060bbbaf8c4139f974696d5fc3be48bd9d9d46eb166f55f7c024fb2
SHA512:	bc9e0affc52ea052eebf1d4b2aff0e89bec9b4780f14914ef14e27bb44a83e266791555fd79b5c1117953b37fe4623b2f6afeffb4f281a0d94e9a4261b882284
SSDEEP:	1536:R3iKaQ7P66xgWbXPIT+VvVkby0A4OiUheAImOF+V3:fPFN0Tg9kby0siA/ROF+V3
TLSH:	83436A1837F60225F2FF5FF529E16162C639F7236903965F24C902DA0713A8ACD51AF6
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...H..f............................>.... ........@.. .......................@............@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00928e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x40fc3e
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE
DLL Characteristics:	DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x66831D48 [Mon Jul 1 21:19:04 2024 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xfbf0	0x4b	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x10000	0x4be	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x12000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0xdc44	0xde00	baa958dc94d5b167404e977146ec8d4f	False	0.6002956081081081	data	5.991674708313243	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x10000	0x4be	0x600	635a1219cb3c0e23809638fc919ab03d	False	0.3697916666666667	data	3.686881748510271	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x12000	0xc	0x200	58ee1032f6af482ce652886dbcd7809c	False	0.044921875	data	0.08153941234324169	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country	ZLIB Complexity
RT_VERSION	0x100a0	0x234	data			0.4716312056737589
RT_MANIFEST	0x102d4	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, Unicode text, UTF-8 (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators			0.5469387755102041

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:08.283756018 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:08.289947033 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:08.290194988 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:08.474205971 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:08.480635881 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:20.420104027 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:20.427763939 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:32.380182028 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:32.384958982 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:44.320082903 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:44.327402115 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:56.273180962 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:56.279546976 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:08.226607084 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:08.233464956 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:09.476289034 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:09.482713938 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:20.335757971 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:20.342751026 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:20.351176023 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:20.358215094 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:20.366816998 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:20.373672962 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:20.398129940 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:20.402987003 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:20.414129972 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:20.419013023 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:20.429286003 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:20.434169054 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:25.413786888 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:25.420149088 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:34.274250031 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:34.280606031 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:35.601562977 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:35.606400013 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:35.710988998 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:35.715758085 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:35.758014917 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:35.762754917 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:36.882520914 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:36.887677908 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:38.383049011 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:38.389580011 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:38.945117950 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:38.951742887 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:40.913786888 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:40.920202971 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:44.179810047 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:44.186912060 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:53.164052963 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:53.171169043 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:58.024579048 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:58.033519030 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:58.992074966 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:33:58.998759031 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:01.414079905 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:01.419080019 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:02.226635933 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:02.231954098 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:02.242299080 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:02.250699997 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:02.289421082 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:02.296400070 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.601511002 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.607888937 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.617067099 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.624032021 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.648293018 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.655318022 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.773552895 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.780433893 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.804647923 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.811419964 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.820195913 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.826709032 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.867064953 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.875735044 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.882869959 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.889520884 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.914063931 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.920452118 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.945328951 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.951540947 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.960812092 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.967046976 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.976371050 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:07.982722044 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:08.039118052 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:08.046104908 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:09.820207119 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:09.826582909 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:21.785737038 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:22.007431030 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:22.319930077 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:22.746247053 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:22.746259928 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:22.746268034 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:22.976600885 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:22.983740091 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:25.446165085 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:25.452150106 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:25.617252111 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:25.622734070 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:31.148428917 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:31.366837978 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:31.387351990 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:31.387366056 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:33.648632050 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:33.655334949 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:38.900151014 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:38.907917023 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:42.461194992 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:42.467982054 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:43.757795095 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:43.764770985 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:43.898646116 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:43.907260895 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:44.179766893 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:44.187383890 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:44.195552111 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:44.202931881 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:54.367341995 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:54.372127056 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:59.773411989 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:34:59.781447887 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:05.335978031 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:05.342515945 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:10.539167881 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:10.545511961 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:10.570318937 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:10.575361967 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:10.585954905 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:10.591981888 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:12.961075068 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:12.968214035 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:15.711249113 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:15.717544079 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:15.726608992 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:15.733087063 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:27.679828882 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:27.684683084 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:28.959491968 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:28.962657928 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:30.883028984 CEST	49706	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:30.887070894 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:30.890341997 CEST	54251	49706	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:30.893811941 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:30.894295931 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:31.019138098 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:31.023977041 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:31.039150953 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:31.043953896 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.148578882 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.155071974 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.273605108 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.279881954 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.289243937 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.295341015 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.320528984 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.326968908 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.601821899 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.608747959 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.664205074 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.670938015 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.679909945 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.686486959 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.695408106 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.702387094 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.711093903 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:36.717653036 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:40.368356943 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:40.375300884 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:51.477274895 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:51.483793020 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:55.104372025 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:55.110842943 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:55.914397955 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:55.921281099 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:57.985822916 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:57.990684032 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.398704052 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.406986952 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.414448023 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.419533968 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.430017948 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.435175896 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.508311987 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.513259888 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.523638964 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.528517962 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.586153030 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.592602015 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.601670027 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.606570005 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.617806911 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.622623920 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.633107901 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.638025045 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.648669004 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:35:58.653539896 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:36:03.898994923 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:36:03.903994083 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:36:03.914510965 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:36:03.919512033 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:36:04.101852894 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:36:04.106971025 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:36:06.633133888 CEST	57057	54251	192.168.2.9	147.185.221.20
Jul 2, 2024 00:36:06.640301943 CEST	54251	57057	147.185.221.20	192.168.2.9

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:08.254940033 CEST	57269	53	192.168.2.9	1.1.1.1
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:08.266727924 CEST	53	57269	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:20.282305002 CEST	53	55712	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.9
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:21.813931942 CEST	53	63116	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.9

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:08.254940033 CEST	192.168.2.9	1.1.1.1	0xbcde	Standard query (0)	people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Jul 2, 2024 00:32:08.266727924 CEST	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.9	0xbcde	No error (0)	people-climbing.gl.at.ply.gg		147.185.221.20	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

Target ID:	0
Start time:	18:31:58
Start date:	01/07/2024
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\fg}.exe"
Imagebase:	0x4d0000
File size:	59'392 bytes
MD5 hash:	E9A886374BECFB0A5B1DC0FFCEE1A04A
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_XWorm, Description: Yara detected XWorm, Source: 00000000.00000000.1314086519.00000000004D2000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT, Description: Detects AsyncRAT, Source: 00000000.00000000.1314086519.00000000004D2000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Author: ditekSHen
Reputation:	low
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Function 00007FF886E21168 Relevance: 1.8, Strings: 1, Instructions: 556COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Strings

SAO_^, xrefs: 00007FF886E213B1

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.3780667056.00007FF886E20000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FF886E20000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ff886e20000_fg}.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID: SAO_^
API String ID: 0-3650529936
Opcode ID: fa24e017852f6536c076565492910c6c4b217feeab1970d1a707b4b9671ac4d1
Instruction ID: b44f826614642f315dcb5c68a9afd09b50d85df20c3a0f516858e5d870ba7ebc
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: fa24e017852f6536c076565492910c6c4b217feeab1970d1a707b4b9671ac4d1
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: CF02A171A2CA494BEB94EB7C84697B97BD2FF99740F500579E40EC33D2DE28AC418742

Function 00007FF886E273A6 Relevance: .5, Instructions: 489COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.3780667056.00007FF886E20000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FF886E20000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ff886e20000_fg}.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 311849e37b2d7d16c51ab6be56d81647cc93eb843e2ab5d9216c920aec507cb8
Instruction ID: ab31e142981f76ebb528a3239dc6604721cf2aa3a0356ec1dd65b4a3bdc85ec6
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 311849e37b2d7d16c51ab6be56d81647cc93eb843e2ab5d9216c920aec507cb8
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 29F1B430918A4D8FEFA8DF28C8957E977E2FF54350F14426AE84DC7291DB389945CB82

Function 00007FF886E28152 Relevance: .5, Instructions: 465COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.3780667056.00007FF886E20000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FF886E20000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ff886e20000_fg}.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 07d82ec479a938d3e55a5c6a774f8bab93629e55bd4d01e2f1b7211e735aaa96
Instruction ID: cc2ad4adbfc1ff0d7be403fb175d927d5d33cf93089f2f98414e73cd065ae4b0
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 07d82ec479a938d3e55a5c6a774f8bab93629e55bd4d01e2f1b7211e735aaa96
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 0AE1B470908A4E8FEBA8DF28C8557EA77D2FF54350F14426EE84DC7291DE38A945CB81

Function 00007FF886E21030 Relevance: 1.6, APIs: 1, Instructions: 138COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.3780667056.00007FF886E20000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FF886E20000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ff886e20000_fg}.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
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Opcode ID: e50136f01790fc8fd3d0ee3c2175b2819d53c2ee8c876aaeec862e80193b6713
Instruction ID: 49ac00435d891db69ff69520a75134471b7adcd8d8e4ff63d1d8e6e431875c09
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: e50136f01790fc8fd3d0ee3c2175b2819d53c2ee8c876aaeec862e80193b6713
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 1941F47190C6888FDB19DFA89845AF9BBF1FF56311F14016EE08AC3293DA646846C791

Non-executed Functions

Function 00007FF886E20E2D Relevance: .2, Instructions: 210COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.3780667056.00007FF886E20000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FF886E20000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_7ff886e20000_fg}.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: ae06e678dc6b45193e2b72343cd15c987e470250187d2738478eeb235cd9bb38
Instruction ID: 125826d2db8fd04860f73c72f50617cd9f7c05053ee9e795309eaa042c4afb77
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: ae06e678dc6b45193e2b72343cd15c987e470250187d2738478eeb235cd9bb38
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: AD51EBA7E2D56205F3117BFD74152EA2B40DFE23B5B188577E1CC8E1D3DD0C248A829A

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) and Windows Remote Management (WinRM).Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation, WMI: WMI Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Driver: Driver Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Sensor Health: Host Status, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report fg}.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Threat Intel

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Xworm

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Networking

Operating System Destruction

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Boot Survival

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\XClient.lnk

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XClient.exe

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Windows Analysis Report
fg}.exe