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Windows Analysis Report
QME#U5b9e#U9a8c#U5ba4#U4eea#U5668#U7cfb#U7edf#U8fd0#U884c#U5305.rar

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	QME#U5b9e#U9a8c#U5ba4#U4eea#U5668#U7cfb#U7edf#U8fd0#U884c#U5305.rar renamed because original name is a hash value
Original sample name:	QME.rar
Analysis ID:	1447792
MD5:	c3b7f4b4fee36e0f766546f18a3c5129
SHA1:	6d2c93b6f125c16248bce9e208476c991a5420ef
SHA256:	58736517b103b8ed1490b43b28e7984409853b1dd835804388c4ca87108fa3d6

Detection

Score:	1
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	80%

Signatures

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64_ra

OpenWith.exe (PID: 7044 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\OpenWith.exe -Embedding MD5: E4A834784FA08C17D47A1E72429C5109)

cleanup

Yara Signatures

⊘No yara matches

Sigma Signatures

⊘No Sigma rule has matched

Snort Signatures

⊘No Snort rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

There are no malicious signatures, click here to show all signatures.

Source: classification engine

Classification label: clean1.winRAR@1/0@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:7044:120:WilError_03

Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: onecoreuapcommonproxystub.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: twinui.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: powrprof.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: dwmapi.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: pdh.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: umpdc.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: onecorecommonproxystub.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: actxprxy.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: propsys.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: windows.staterepositoryps.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: windows.ui.appdefaults.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: windows.ui.immersive.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: ntmarta.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: uiautomationcore.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: dui70.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: duser.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: dwrite.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: bcp47mrm.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: uianimation.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: d3d11.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: dxgi.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: d3d10warp.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: resourcepolicyclient.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: dxcore.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: dcomp.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: oleacc.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: edputil.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: windows.ui.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: windowmanagementapi.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: textinputframework.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: inputhost.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: twinapi.appcore.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: coremessaging.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: twinapi.appcore.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: coremessaging.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: coreuicomponents.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: coreuicomponents.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: coremessaging.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: windowscodecs.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: thumbcache.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: policymanager.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: msvcp110_win.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: appresolver.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: bcp47langs.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: slc.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: sppc.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: tiledatarepository.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: staterepository.core.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: windows.staterepository.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: wtsapi32.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: windows.staterepositorycore.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: mrmcorer.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: appxdeploymentclient.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: sxs.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: directmanipulation.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: textshaping.dll
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Section loaded: ninput.dll

Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{95E15D0A-66E6-93D9-C53C-76E6219D3341}\InProcServer32

Source: QME#U5b9e#U9a8c#U5ba4#U4eea#U5668#U7cfb#U7edf#U8fd0#U884c#U5305.rar

Static file information: File size 2889623 > 1048576

Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe TID: 7048

Thread sleep count: 40 > 30

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeui.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segmdl2.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segmdl2.ttf VolumeInformation

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	OS Credential Dumping	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	LSASS Memory	1 File and Directory Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information	Security Account Manager	11 System Information Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

⊘No Antivirus matches

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

⊘No contacted domains info

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	40.0.0 Tourmaline
Analysis ID:	1447792
Start date and time:	2024-05-27 03:25:31 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultwindowsinteractivecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	13
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	EGA enabled
Analysis Mode:	stream
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	QME#U5b9e#U9a8c#U5ba4#U4eea#U5668#U7cfb#U7edf#U8fd0#U884c#U5305.rar renamed because original name is a hash value
Original Sample Name:	QME.rar
Detection:	CLEAN
Classification:	clean1.winRAR@1/0@0/0

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, svchost.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ctldl.windowsupdate.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Created / dropped Files

⊘No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General

File type:	RAR archive data, v5
Entropy (8bit):	7.999354489845494
TrID:	RAR Archive (5005/1) 100.00%
File name:	QME#U5b9e#U9a8c#U5ba4#U4eea#U5668#U7cfb#U7edf#U8fd0#U884c#U5305.rar
File size:	2'889'623 bytes
MD5:	c3b7f4b4fee36e0f766546f18a3c5129
SHA1:	6d2c93b6f125c16248bce9e208476c991a5420ef
SHA256:	58736517b103b8ed1490b43b28e7984409853b1dd835804388c4ca87108fa3d6
SHA512:	0089f131503412a6fab116b2615f67e22b7c95e8ddc1b49d2d0866e5661c189b23f3aa2d517a2a675ba5dc411cbb3a0f22ab55adde99f15361366ff773f1a5df
SSDEEP:	49152:McZCqTRH/HALce3eUQvJeWoUTj9EtdndcufV3n1wzF48G+SGsGrgsCC8iAX/PM:FCqTWLce3seCuddciV3nKzFpXPnvKHM
TLSH:	36D533D873F99B83AAAA34D4D3D34AEA9D65B491DF111B3CC632FCE12617703A46124C
File Content Preview:	Rar!....d..?..............?.SM.......... b....+./QME............................../data/Data.txt......D.!...J..0.33DE.VT......lb.iO7...-..H..}......S<8.h.%.q2.W...u...Q..d....i.......................Z.=../..=.x..^3...^.....L.t..i.N.......:Lo.i/.L=..L..{Iz

File Icon


Icon Hash:	72e2a2a292a2a2b2

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report QME#U5b9e#U9a8c#U5ba4#U4eea#U5668#U7cfb#U7edf#U8fd0#U884c#U5305.rar

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

System Summary

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Windows Analysis Report
QME#U5b9e#U9a8c#U5ba4#U4eea#U5668#U7cfb#U7edf#U8fd0#U884c#U5305.rar