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Windows
Analysis Report
DHL_#U53d1#U7968.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
GuLoader, Lokibot
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Icon mismatch, binary includes an icon from a different legit application in order to fool users
Yara detected Lokibot
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Yara detected GuLoader
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to detect Any.run
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Uses 32bit PE files
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
Detected potential crypto function
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Enables debug privileges
Drops PE files
Tries to load missing DLLs
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Found evaded block containing many API calls
PE / OLE file has an invalid certificate
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Classification
- System is w10x64native
- DHL_#U53d1#U7968.exe (PID: 4900 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\Deskto p\DHL_#U53 d1#U7968.e xe MD5: 3A4573D8D04DF837BD32D2EF156E44AA) - DHL_#U53d1#U7968.exe (PID: 8008 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\Deskto p\DHL_#U53 d1#U7968.e xe MD5: 3A4573D8D04DF837BD32D2EF156E44AA)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
CloudEyE, GuLoader | CloudEyE (initially named GuLoader) is a small VB5/6 downloader. It typically downloads RATs/Stealers, such as Agent Tesla, Arkei/Vidar, Formbook, Lokibot, Netwire and Remcos, often but not always from Google Drive. The downloaded payload is xored. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Loki Password Stealer (PWS), LokiBot | "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets." - PhishMeLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.Loki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of -u that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.The Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123.Loki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: %APPDATA%\ C98066\.There can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: .exe, .lck, .hdb and .kdb. They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: 6B250D. Below is the explanation of their purpose:FILE EXTENSIONFILE DESCRIPTION.exeA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into.lckA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts.hdbA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server.kdbA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 serverIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.The first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.The second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.The third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.Communications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.The first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.The second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:BYTEPAYLOAD TYPE0x26Stolen Cryptocurrency Wallet0x27Stolen Application Data0x28Get C2 Commands from C2 Server0x29Stolen File0x2APOS (Point of Sale?)0x2BKeylogger Data0x2CScreenshotThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically ckav.ru. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!Loki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.The Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bots C2 infrastructure.Loki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:BYTEINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION0x00Download EXE & Execute0x01Download DLL & Load #10x02Download DLL & Load #20x08Delete HDB File0x09Start Keylogger0x0AMine & Steal Data0x0EExit Loki-Bot0x0FUpgrade Loki-Bot0x10Change C2 Polling Frequency0x11Delete Executables & ExitSuricata SignaturesRULE SIDRULE NAME2024311ET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected2024312ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M12024313ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M12024314ET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected2024315ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M12024316ET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected2024317ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M22024318ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M22024319ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2 |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1 | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1 | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2 | Yara detected GuLoader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1 | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security |
⊘No Sigma rule has matched
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20216.128.145.19649835802024313 08/10/23-19:13:04.980323 |
SID: | 2024313 |
Source Port: | 49835 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20216.128.145.19649835802024318 08/10/23-19:13:04.980323 |
SID: | 2024318 |
Source Port: | 49835 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20216.128.145.19649832802024317 08/10/23-19:13:02.382054 |
SID: | 2024317 |
Source Port: | 49832 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20216.128.145.19649833802024312 08/10/23-19:13:03.684720 |
SID: | 2024312 |
Source Port: | 49833 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20216.128.145.19649833802021641 08/10/23-19:13:03.684720 |
SID: | 2021641 |
Source Port: | 49833 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20216.128.145.19649835802021641 08/10/23-19:13:04.980323 |
SID: | 2021641 |
Source Port: | 49835 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20216.128.145.19649833802024317 08/10/23-19:13:03.684720 |
SID: | 2024317 |
Source Port: | 49833 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20216.128.145.19649832802021641 08/10/23-19:13:02.382054 |
SID: | 2021641 |
Source Port: | 49832 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 192.168.11.20216.128.145.19649832802024312 08/10/23-19:13:02.382054 |
SID: | 2024312 |
Source Port: | 49832 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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Source: | ReversingLabs: |
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Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00406719 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_004065CF | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00402B75 |
Networking |
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